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Abstract 
The crisis in the foundations of mathematics is a conceptual crisis. I suggest that 
we embrace the crisis and adopt a pluralist position towards foundations. There 
are many foundations in mathematics. However, ‘many foundations’ (for one 
building) is an oxymoron. Therefore, we shift vocabulary to say that mathematics, 
as one discipline, is composed of many different theories. This entails that there are 
no absolute mathematical truths, only truths within a theory. There is no unified, 
consistent ontology, only ontology within a theory. 
Conceptual crises teach us that there is an instability in our 
preconceptions, theories or in our philosophical goals.  The crisis in 
the foundations of mathematics is something we can regret, or 
something we can learn from. What I, and others, have learned is to 
abandon the goal of providing one formal mathematical theory as a 
foundation for the whole of mathematics.  
In abandoning this goal, our first step is to embrace a moderate 
form of pluralism: ‘Pluralism in Foundations’, where we accept 
several foundations of mathematics. However, in seriously 
entertaining the idea of competing, or equally plausible, foundations 
in mathematics, we learn that the very notion of a formal theory being a 
‘foundation’ for mathematics is unstable, and therefore that the very 
idea of ‘foundation’ (in mathematics) should be revisited.  
This line of thinking takes us to the next step, where we open the 
door to a world of Pluralisms. From the doorway, we can now 
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consider Pluralism in: epistemology, ontology, methodology and 
truth. In this paper, I shall take you to the doorway to this greater 
Pluralism. 
Before starting on this path, let me fend off an easy confusion 
between Pluralism in Logic and Pluralism in Mathematics. Logical 
Pluralism1 is a more established position than is Pluralism in 
Mathematics. A Logical Pluralist accepts different formal logical 
systems (usually propositional, modal, first-order or possibly second-
order logic). See Haack (1978), Da Costa (2007), Batens (2002), for 
examples of logical Pluralists. See Beall and Restall (2006) for a fully 
articulated position called ‘Logical Pluralism’.  
In contrast, Pluralism in the philosophy of mathematics is a 
Pluralism about different mathematical theories as developed and 
practiced by recognised mathematicians.2 What Pluralism in Theories 
amounts to is (at least) Pluralism in: epistemology, ontology, 
methodology and truth. There is no well worked-out philosophical 
position called Pluralism in Mathematics in print, to date. Sketches of 
positions can be found in Aberdein (2005), Bueno (2011) and Friend 
(2012), amongst others. Moreover, many present-day philosophers of 
mathematics work in a very pluralist way, but since there is no 
properly worked-out philosophical position, they are rarely specific 
about the delimitations of their Pluralism. Many philosophers, 
computer scientists, logicians and mathematicians tell me that they 
are pluralist, and, when they say that, they mean quite different things 
______________ 
1 I am using capitals to name a philosophical position, as opposed to naming 
an attribute of a philosophical position. For example, “pluralism is an 
attribute of some forms of Structuralism”, but “Pluralism is a philosophical 
position”.   
2 Here, ‘recognition’ is determined socially and institutionally. This is not to 
say that one has to be a university professor, in order to be considered to be 
a mathematician. Rather, one has to be engaged in the practice of 
mathematics, as it is recognised by said institutions. I think that this is the 
best the Pluralist philosopher can do (since he, or she, recognises no unique 
foundation for mathematics). The socio-institutional criterion is imperfect 
by its own standards, since, in retrospect, someone rejected by the 
institution (in the wide political sense) might later be recognised as an 
important contributor to mathematics. Similarly, someone judged as ‘having 
an impact’ might later fade into the background, as we discover better 
techniques or favour other theories.   
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by the term. For lack of a well worked-out, and in print, exposition of 
Pluralism as a philosophy of mathematics, this paper too is a sketch. 
Nevertheless, I can say a few things to help us understand 
Pluralism better. Pluralism in mathematics is most starkly contrasted 
to the more traditional philosophies of mathematics which 
contributed to, and were developed in reaction to, the crisis in the 
foundations of mathematics. In these traditional philosophies, we 
propose one mathematical theory as a foundation for the whole of 
mathematics. With philosophical maturity, the founding theory 
becomes a norm for mathematical practice, or is intended to set a 
norm for future practice.3 Examples include Realism, Logicism, and 
some versions of Constructivism, Naturalism, Formalism, 
Fictionalism and Structuralism. In contrast, Pluralism in Foundations 
(which is the first position we shall visit) rejects the idea of one 
foundation (in particular, in the form of a formal mathematical 
theory). The Pluralist in Foundations also rejects the normativity, nay 
prescriptivity, which accompanies traditional theories. Judgments 
about mathematical theories or theorems or hypotheses etc. are made 
from within a context, which is revisable, one standpoint amongst 
others (from which to make a judgment), and, therefore, not 
absolute.  This is a lesson we can learn from the crisis, and it has 
taken us a while to learn it. The lesson was not learned in one step. 
Between our extreme Pluralism and the monism of the traditional 
positions, we can find some ‘in-between’ philosophies.  
Philosophers of mathematics, who break from the more 
traditional positions are characterised, here, as favourably using the 
term ‘pluralism’ to name a characteristic of their position. We find the 
term used in some versions of: Structuralism, Formalism, 
Fictionalism or Naturalism.  
In contrast to these in-between positions, the Pluralist places 
‘pluralism’ as the chief virtue of his version of Pluralism. The Pluralist 
is inspired by the in-between positions, but goes beyond them. 
Forthwith, I restrict attention to the more traditional positions and 
______________ 
3 The founding theory is a norm in the following sense: purported 
mathematical work is not recognised as proper mathematics if it cannot, in 
principle, be reduced to the founding theory. There are strong philosophical 
objections to foundational theories. See, for example, (Vopeňka 1979), 
(Bueno 2011). 
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Pluralism, ignoring the in-between positions.4 Traditional positions 
support one foundation to mathematics. The path to Pluralism starts 
by acknowledging several.   
1. Preliminaries: Organisation, Argument and Approach 
In this paper, I shall not give a strong direct argument for 
Pluralism. Instead, I shall discuss some motivating considerations, 
and then make an indirect argument, by giving a sense of the 
philosophical work which is done by a ‘Pluralist’ who takes on one 
version of Pluralism. To re-emphasise: I write ‘one version’ because 
there are many versions. The Pluralist is pluralist about Pluralism! 
The versions vary along at least two axes. One is: what it is one is 
pluralist about (this is not the same as ontology – it has to do with 
subject matter); the other is propositional: how one deals with the 
issues of truth and the conflict between claims, in and about 
mathematics.5  
The Pluralism I shall start with (but revise) is a Pluralism about 
foundations in mathematics, the defender of which, insists that truth 
can only make sense within a mathematical theory.  
For such a Pluralist, a mathematical theory is not true in itself. It 
can only be true with reference to a meta-theory (usually by showing 
it to be equivalent to, or reducible to, that meta-theory). Such is 
familiar from Shapiro’s Structuralism. This Pluralist arranges 
discussions in and about mathematics into a hierarchy of theories and 
meta-theories, distinguishing claims made within a theory from claims 
made about a theory, from the standpoint of a meta-theory. 
The reason I start with this version of Pluralism is to meet a 
traditional philosopher of mathematics halfway. I can start with 
philosophical positions which are recognisable to her. As we shall see, 
______________ 
4 For detailed comparisons of the in-between positions and Pluralism, see 
(Friend 2012). 
5 Strictly speaking, the default Pluralist view is that ‘truth’ is handled by a 
formal logical theory, or at least, the formal theory is a guide to how we are 
to deal with questions of truth. Are the logical theories, themselves true or 
false? No. Similarly, the mathematical theories are neither true nor false.   
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Pluralism in Foundations is unstable. We shall modify it in due 
course. 
I anticipate various reactions. If the presented Pluralist positions 
strike the reader as anathema to the philosophy of mathematics as it 
should be practiced, then more detailed, careful and convincing 
arguments are called for. But this is not the place for those. If the 
positions resonate with the reader, he might already be a Pluralist. If 
the positions and example of work done by the Pluralist appeal to the 
reader, he might be interested in looking further into Pluralism as a 
philosophy. 
2. The Pluralist about ‘Foundations’ of Mathematics 
We begin with a simplifying assumption, in order to present the 
initial position. The assumption will be revised when we set the 
Pluralist to work. The simplifying assumption is:  
a proposed foundation (to mathematics) is a mathematical theory, and 
mathematical theories are individuated by a language, a set of axioms 
and some inference rules.  
Under this assumption, we can list different purported 
‘foundations’. Some foundations of mathematics include Zermelo-
Fraenkel set theory with an axiom of choice and consistent 
extensions of ZFC. If we take the simplifying assumption seriously, 
then we can also count as foundations: non-well-founded set 
theories, type-theories, category theories and any other theory to 
which a lot of mathematics can, in principle, be reduced.6 Finding 
such a foundation is the goal of the more traditional philosophies of 
______________ 
6 If we do not take the assumption seriously, then we might think that all of 
these theories are much on a par, and are all aspects, or parts, of ‘one big 
founding idea’ of mathematics. Woolley language aside, in this case, the 
word ‘theory’ is used in a much looser sense than what is proposed in the 
simplifying assumption. To keep the discussion focused, we make the 
simplifying assumption, and we can look at a looser idea of theory or 
foundation later.   
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mathematics. In contrast, the Pluralist accepts that there are several 
big theories – many of which are plausible.7  
The Pluralist in Foundations is agnostic as to which is the correct 
foundation, and over whether there is one unique foundation. 
Note that when we speak and write about several ‘foundational 
theories’ co-existing, the very term ‘foundation’ changes meaning. 
The building metaphor no longer works. It makes no sense to have 
several foundations for one building called ‘mathematics’. Since the 
Pluralist is agnostic as to whether there are one or several 
‘foundations’, and in order not to beg any questions, we speak of 
‘umbrella’ theories.  
3. Considerations Supporting the Pluralist’s Agnosticism 
With the shift in vocabulary from ‘foundational theory’ to 
‘umbrella theory’, we draw attention to the distinction between our 
philosophical aspirations and the philosophical claims we can defend 
in argument. Pluralists might hope that mathematics will one day turn 
out to be unified in one umbrella theory, but, and this is important, 
such hope is simply a subjective private feeling, and is not supported 
on present evidence. So, similarly, a Pluralist might hope (maybe 
perversely) that there are several irreducible umbrella theories in 
mathematics, and that there will never, nor can ever, even in 
principle, be a way of unifying these. Again this is a hope and a 
private conviction. The Pluralist, as a (public) philosopher is simply 
agnostic on the issue of unification of mathematics; mutatis mutandis 
for the idea of ‘truth of’ a theory. No mathematical theory is true tout 
court. A mathematical theory can only be true relative to another 
theory (by being shown to be reducible to (or embeddable in) that 
theory). Whether the reducing theory is true, will depend again on 
another reducing theory. In fact, for the Pluralist, trying to determine 
the truth of a theory, in the absence of a meta-theory, or reducing 
theory is labour lost. It is more informative to frankly discuss 
embeddings, reductions, equi-consistency proofs and other limitative 
______________ 
7 Keep track of the word ‘plausible’. We shall revisit it.  
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results on a mathematical theory than the truth of the theory.8 This 
agnostic attitude makes sense of the following remark, which I quote 
because I find it representative of some mathematicians’ 
philosophical discomfort. Discussing the truth and independence of 
the continuum hypothesis, they write:  
These logical results [of the independence of CH] do not settle the 
question originally asked by Cantor whether CH or GCH are true 
or false statements. However, it must be said that these seemingly 
obvious questions are not very clear: the concepts of truth and falsity 
(as opposed to the concept of the derivability from axioms) do not have 
a clear meaning in abstract set theory. Thus we cannot rule out the 
possibility that Cantor’s original questions will turn out to be simply 
meaningless. (Kuratowski and Mostowski 1976, p. 290). 
The Pluralist’s agnosticism is motivated by the following 
considerations:  
 
(1) there are several, non-equivalent, umbrella theories – many of 
which have natural philosophical alliances (philosophies which 
accompany that umbrella theory). Call an ‘umbrella theory plus its 
natural philosophy’ a ‘traditional position’.  
 
(2) No traditional position is accepted by all mathematicians or by 
all philosophers.  
 
(3) Moreover, there does not seem to be an immanent 
convergence of opinion (as we can see in a number of the papers in 
this volume). 
 
______________ 
8 It is for this reason that ‘Pluralism’ is favoured as a name over ‘Relativism’ 
since the issues of truth and ontology are side-issues for the Pluralist. In 
contrast, the Relativist is first and foremost concerned with truth and 
ontology. Pluralism is related to Relativism in the following way: Pluralism is 
a mature Relativism. The Pluralist goes beyond Relativism because he is 
relativist along more dimensions than truth and ontology. The more mature 
Pluralist position is relativist about truth, ontology, mathematical theories, 
epistemology, logic and methodology.  
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Depending on how finely we want to distinguish traditional 
positions, we might even think that there are a large number of 
candidate potential positions not yet developed or explored.9 It seems 
then, that rather than look for one foundation for mathematics, we 
should learn to accept the idea that there are several umbrella 
theories, several potential traditional positions, many of which are 
plausible; and therefore, no traditional position is correct in stating 
that their championed big theory represents ‘mathematics’. This 
motivates a further modification of language. Rather than speak of the 
true mathematical theory (or foundation), we can speak of ‘plausible 
umbrella theories’.  
When we replace ‘truth of a theory’ with ‘plausibility of a theory’ a 
few interesting things happen. First note that ‘plausibility’ is a relative 
term. Nevertheless, positions are rarely equally plausible. Sometimes, 
one position is more plausible than another on grounds of 
philosophy of logic. For example, trivial theories are implausible. We 
could also try to argue that one mathematical theory is implausible 
because it is illogical or unreasonable. The strongest way to make 
such an argument is by appeal to a particular formal logic. For 
example, we might decide that a mathematical theory is implausible 
because it endorses unrestricted choice, which is not allowed in a 
constructive logic. However, in the light of a Pluralism about formal 
logical systems, such an argument begs the question. Of course, not 
all of us are Logical Pluralists, but, today, logical monists have to 
defend their monism as well as their choice of logic. We could try to 
appeal to an informal notion of reasoning and logic, but this is usually 
unsatisfactory, since ambiguous (i.e., underdetermined) and therefore 
leading to disagreement (only solved by appeal to a formal system of 
logic). So the only sure lesson we can learn by appeal to logic or 
reasoning is to dismiss trivial theories as implausible. But this will not 
be very helpful in narrowing the field of plausible foundations! 
Thankfully, the contrast between trivial and non-trivial 
mathematical theories is not the only recourse we have to rate the 
plausibility of a mathematical theory. Plausibility judgments can also 
______________ 
9 We have to be careful about judgments about ‘large numbers of positions’, 
especially, if we consider not-in-print positions. First we have to individuate 
positions, next we have to decide what the parameters are on possible 
positions.  
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depend on background knowledge. Presumably, a budding 
mathematician with little experience and a very narrow area of 
specialisation is in a lesser position to make a judgment about 
plausibility, since what is plausible to her will depend on her 
experience, and resemblance with what she knows of mathematics. In 
contrast, a mathematician with a vast experience of mathematics and 
mathematical theories, might well decide that one umbrella theory is 
more plausible than another. An example is Gödel, although, strictly 
speaking, he would not have accepted our simplifying assumption. 
So, knowledge and experience can be used to partially evaluate 
plausibility. For this reason, attributing plausibility partly comes from 
an educated judgment, not a mere declaration of taste.  
Alas, even amongst the most educated, we do not have consensus, 
nor do we seem to be heading towards a convergence of judgments. 
Future arguments and future information might lead to convergence, 
divergence, or convergence followed by divergence, divergence 
followed by convergence; we simply do not know. Under these 
considerations, we have no rational basis, nor authoritative basis 
(based on amount of education),10 nor inductive basis, upon which to 
make a choice for one position as the true position.11 It is for this 
reason that the Pluralist demurs from making a choice, and accepts all 
plausible umbrella theories as on a par, in the first instance (i.e., they 
will be subjected to further evaluation since we are aware that 
‘plausibility’ is a relative term requiring qualification). The Pluralist is 
a principled agnostic (as opposed to a lazy agnostic).12 For the 
______________ 
10 ‘Amount of education’ is, of course, not to be confused with number of 
degrees or prestige of award granting institutions. Here ‘education’ is meant 
in the basic sense of pursued, sustained and critical enquiry. University 
degrees are a rough indicator. 
11 We can work to find the most plausible big theory, but given that to 
determine what is the most plausible theory, we have to make some choices 
which will seem arbitrary or questionable to some (respectable people), the 
purpose of so doing becomes unclear; unless we take it as a private project 
responding to our private convictions. To remain in the public sphere, we 
are rationally more secure in noting different notions of plausibility, and 
evaluating which theories fit which notions. 
12 A lazy agnostic is not interested in the debate (any more). So she gives up, 
and just says she is agnostic. A principled agnostic is interested in 
comparing, evaluating the comparison, changing his mind and being honest 
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principled agnostic, the traditional philosophies are not supportable 
on present evidence.  
Some readers will be bristling, and I leave them in this state. 
Instead of giving a knock-down defence of Pluralism, or an 
exposition of the whole Pluralist position, I turn to what it is that the 
Pluralist does, as a philosopher of mathematics. The purpose is to 
fend off the reductio argument against the Pluralist that the Pluralist 
cannot practice philosophy. Rather, what is left to her is: sociology, 
psychology, history, historiography and so on – anything but 
philosophy. Actual, therefore possible, as the Mediaevals taught us. 
Since Pluralism in Foundations is unstable, I, instead, display the 
practice of the Pluralist in Mathematical Theories who is interested in 
the question of foundations. Details about his position, or rather, the 
family of positions he could occupy, need not concern us here.  
4. Setting the Pluralist in Mathematical Theories to Work 
To stay with the same theme of ‘foundational mathematics’, the 
Pluralist does not ignore and merely dismiss the foundational 
aspiration. Au contraire, the Pluralist concedes that there is something 
to the claim that ZFC is a ‘foundation’, even if we have learned to call 
it an ‘umbrella’ theory. After all, a number of very well respected 
mathematicians take ZFC, or something like it, to be very important. 
The observation is not lost on the Pluralist, who will now work with 
this observation. We can start by revising our simplifying assumption, 
and say something more accurate, namely that:  
set theory (not ZFC, which is one formal representation of set theory, 
but whatever it is that ZFC+ is meant to represent) is really used as 
a ‘lingua franca’ or a ‘reference point’ by mathematicians (usually by 
appeal to the formal theory).  
                                                                                                                  
and industrious towards the question. He is also well aware that there might 
be no (definitive or even temporary) resolution to the issue under question. 
Maybe ‘industrious agnostic’ would be a better term. ‘Principled’ is meant to 
refer to the idea that there is a defence the agnostic can give for his 
agnosticism, and that he does care deeply about the outcome of the debate, 
but more than this, he cares about the honesty and strength of argument 
used in the debate.  
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We have modified our initial simplifying assumption in two 
respects. One is that we are not individuating theories by formally 
presented theories. The other is that we are talking of reference 
points rather than foundations. In some mathematical circles, set 
theory is ‘central’ to mathematics. Since the Pluralist is agnostic about 
the foundational claim, he wants to know what it is that is appealing 
in the claim that ZFC is a foundation, or why it is that set theory is a 
lingua franca, or a reference point for mathematicians. The claim about 
ZFC is descriptive. Because of this, answers can be sought by: 
sociologists, historians, historiographers, psychologists and so on. But 
the Pluralist can also ask a more philosophical question: “Is set theory 
really the best reference point for an arbitrary mathematical theory?” 
Or, similarly: “Should we continue to use ZFC as a lingua franca?” 
Both are hopelessly vague and ambiguous questions because of the 
words ‘best’ and ‘should’. The Pluralist wants to give a rigorous and 
defendable answer, and we can do this. Let us begin by making some 
of the terms more precise: ‘set theory’ (most loyally represented by 
which formal theory?), ‘the best’ (according to what measure?), 
‘reference point’ (what is the difference between reference point and 
foundation?), ‘arbitrary mathematical theory’ (what gets counted?). 
But we want to do more than this. We want to bear in mind that 
when we make these terms more precise, we set parameters on the 
question, and Pluralists are aware that these parameters can be 
revised. With that caution in mind, let us get to work and propose 
disambiguations of the assumption.  
Working backwards, an ‘arbitrary mathematical theory’ is a theory, 
the inventor, discoverer or developer of which, believes that it is a 
mathematical theory.  It has a formal language, which expresses all of 
the truths, or theorems, in the theory. It might be presented as a 
mathematical structure (as defined by model theory), as an axiomatic 
theory, as a rule-based theory, and possibly in some other way. But 
we cannot allow anything we wish. To give a precise answer to our 
question, within revisable but temporarily set parameters, we need 
‘arbitrary theory’ to be comparable to set theory. To allow 
comparability, an arbitrary theory is either (i) a formally presented 
theory, in which case, let us modify ‘set theory’ to mean formal ZFC, 
or some appropriate version: ZF, ZFC+ etc. Or, (ii) our arbitrary 
theory is not formally presented (or is highly ambiguous between 
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different formal presentations) so our comparison will be made with 
something underlying formally presented set theory, i.e., that to which 
ZFC+ is responsible (or, against which attempts at formal 
representation are judged).  
‘Reference point’ is ambiguous between at least: ‘can be reduced 
to ZFC’, ‘can be shown to be equi-consistent with ZFC’, ‘ZFC can be 
reduced to our theory’ and ‘shares some recognisable features with 
ZFC’. The last is the most nebulous. An example is the theory of 
semisets. The ‘recognisable features’ include sets and all of the 
axioms of set theory (some are a little modified), but our theory also 
includes the theory of semisets, which concerns something less 
definite than a set, that is, less definite in its membership (set 
members we can work with are fixed with respect to a perspective, as 
we change perspective, so the members we can manipulate and work 
with change). ZF is not entirely reducible to the theory of semisets, 
but there is a strong basis for comparison.  
‘The best’ as it is used in the context of our question and given 
our agnosticism, is determined by appeal to the practice of 
mathematics. It means something of the form ‘is recognised by, and 
is respected by, (a good enough number of) recognised and respected 
mathematicians today’. This is far from an absolute and pure 
judgment! Rather, it combines a statistic determined by some sense of 
the ‘institution’ of mathematical research and evaluation. This 
proposed disambiguation of ‘the best’ makes explicit the instability of 
a positive or negative answer to the questions, since it is the 
‘institution of mathematical research’ which will be adding the 
normative force of ‘should’ or determining what counts as ‘best’. Not 
only does the institution change over time, with the people and their 
attitudes, but, there will be different ways of working out what 
mathematicians consider to be the best reference point, depending on 
what we take to represent the ‘institution’. 
 The last term is ‘set theory’. ‘Set theory’ is what underlies the 
various formal representations.13 It is a mathematical theory of sets 
and membership. To make precise, and fix, what ‘set theory’ means, 
______________ 
13 Note that I write as though ‘set theory’ is one thing being formally 
represented. The only reason to write this way is for simplifying the 
conclusion. It is easier to keep some goal posts rigid, for a while. They can 
be moved later.   
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we give a formal representation, or several formal representations. 
Moreover, we often have a sense that the formal representation of set 
theory is not completed. We extend formal set theories by adding 
new axioms, and experimenting with these to see what follows when 
we add them, and try to determine whether or not they are ‘fruitful’ 
or ‘natural’. Again, the latter are also hopelessly vague and ambiguous 
terms, which we can try to make more precise, maybe at the expense 
of our intuitions, in favour of an artificial precision.  
5. Answers 
Already in disambiguating, we have learned a lot about our 
question. The analysis of the very general philosophical question “Is 
set theory really the best reference point for an arbitrary mathematical 
theory? Or, should it be such?” gives some idea of the modus operandi 
of a Pluralist philosopher of mathematics. Having made his 
preliminary analysis, the Pluralist can now give an answer to the 
question.  
The Pluralist will want to make a survey to confirm or disconfirm 
the following guesses.  
 
(1) The first guess is that logicians (broadly construed to include 
set theorists, model theorists, logicians working in different traditions 
for propositional, first-order and second-order logics, proof theorists, 
some computer scientists, and maybe some others) tend to feel more 
secure if they can show that their theory is reducible to ZFC, or some 
formal theory which has ZFC as a core of the theory. They feel secure 
if their theory is equi-consistent with ZFC. That is, ZFC, as a 
reference point affords a sense of security for logicians. 
 
(2) It is the de facto practice amongst logicians to use ZFC as a 
default reference point.  
 
(3) Other logicians turn the tables. They use ‘set theory’ in the 
sense of ‘what underlies the formal representation’ as a core for 
recognising, developing and interpreting formal umbrella theories. 
They treat formal set theory as a starting point, not as a foundation. 
For example, set theory is what is used to compare what happens 
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when we make changes to ZFC, by adding new axioms. So ‘set 
theory’ in this sense, is assumed as a reference point ab initio. These 
logicians are set theorists in the broad sense of working in and 
around ZFC, and seeing mathematical theories in terms of ZFC.14 
 
Indicators that these guesses are correct include the use of the 
notation we find in set theory textbooks, and the use of language, 
axioms and theorems familiar from set theory in the development of 
their own theory. These guesses concern logicians. What about other 
mathematicians? The speculation continues:  
 
(4) some (respected mathematicians) do not use set theory as a 
reference point, and some cannot.  
 
If the fourth guess is correct, then, I speculate that this is because 
amongst ‘real working mathematicians’ (pace the traditional 
philosopher of mathematics) very little attention is paid to set theory, 
or ZFC. They are usually not trained in set theory, and they are 
untroubled by foundational issues. They are also not concerned with 
finding ‘a unique reference point’, or default reference point for the 
theory (or theories) they are working in. Their sense of security is 
based in practice. It is enough if those judging, evaluating and 
correcting their work endorse it, and these endorsers will be people in 
the same or related fields of work in mathematics.  
Is this a question of ‘distribution of labour’ (so all mathematical 
work is traceable, in some way, by more specialised mathematicians 
to set theory) or is it really that set theory simply does not act as a 
reference point? To answer this question, imagine if explicit traces of 
set theory were to disappear. All books about set theory and people 
working in set theory or with a good working knowledge or concern 
about set theory were to be shipped to another part of the galaxy, and 
be incommunicado with the mathematicians left behind. In this case I 
conjecture that there would be little pause in mathematical work, and 
there would be no urge to re-invent set theory, or find an overarching 
reference point or foundational theory. I make the conjecture based 
______________ 
14 I should like to thank Brian Skyrms for pointing out this approach to me 
in conversation. 
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on some areas of mathematics where it makes no sense for ZFC to 
be the reference point for the claims of the theory, such as statistics 
or calculus.15 Testing the conjecture is delicate future work.16   
If my statistical guesses are confirmed by a survey, and my guesses 
are supported by further evidence and argument, then the Pluralist 
answer will be that:  
a lot of logicians use ZFC as a reference point, but this is not 
representative of all mathematicians. 
6. Conclusion 
Having gone through our careful exercise, we will also understand 
a number of subtleties attending the answer, and we can confirm or 
disconfirm and revise my guesses. We also see that we have to leave 
behind the territory familiar to the traditional philosopher of 
mathematics – leave ZFC, and look to the actual practices in 
mathematics.  
More broadly, other Pluralist work includes: showing more 
precisely how Pluralism is different from the in-between positions. 
Recall that these are some versions of Structuralism, Formalism, 
Fictionalism and Naturalism. Most of these comparisons can be 
found elsewhere.  
______________ 
15 We can, of course, reduce, or interpret calculus or statistics in terms of set 
theory, but being able to, and having to do so, or needing to do so are quite 
distinct. Arguably, reducing calculus or statistics to set theory considerably 
distorts these areas of mathematics, and is quite unhelpful. This is not to say 
that a proposed reduction is completely unhelpful and uninformative. 
Rather, it is considerably inefficient if one is interested in calculus – at least 
on present evidence. To insist otherwise is to run the risk either of begging 
the question (so mathematics is just defined in terms of reference to set 
theory), or to make the term ‘set theory’ so broad as to be vacuous: so under 
the imagined scenario of losing trace of set theory, all of mathematics and 
mathematicians would be shipped. As I write, the issue is delicate, and the 
strength of conjecture rests on such work.  
16 We would have to navigate between Scylla and Charybdis. Scylla: if we 
take the term ‘explicit mention’ broadly, we will find that all, or almost all, 
mathematics (post 1870s) would disappear. Charybdis: we might think that 
set theory would still be ‘there’ underlying most mathematical thought.  
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Nevertheless, with the constrained exercise we performed here, 
we have indicated a way to embrace the crisis in the foundations of 
mathematics. We can now stand in the doorway to other forms of 
Pluralism in mathematics.  
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